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We generalize the model of Burdett and Judd (1983) to the case where an arbitrary nite
number of rms sells a homogeneous good to buyers who have heterogeneous search costs. We
show that a price dispersed symmetric Nash equilibrium always exists. Numerical results show
that the behavior of prices with respect to the number of rms hinges upon the shape of the
search cost distribution: when search costs are relatively concentrated (dispersed), entry of rms
leads to higher (lower) average prices.
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The theory of search has become a toolkit for the understanding of the role of informational imperfec-
tions in generating observed market ineciencies. Burdett and Judd's (1983) model of nonsequential
search is one of the seminal contributions. They show that price dispersion can arise as an equilib-
rium phenomenon in environments where rms and consumers are rational and identical. Burdett
and Judd's model of nonsequential search has seen a number of important extensions, including, for
example, McAfee's (1995) study of multiproduct rms, Fershtman and Fishman's (1992) study of
price dynamics, Acemoglu and Shimer's (2000) study of a general equilibrium labour market, and
Janssen and Moraga-Gonz alez (2004) study of oligopolistic pricing. In labor economics, Burdett and
Mortensen's (1998) model has become a canonical framework for explaining wage dispersion and
turnover.
This paper generalizes the nonsequential search model studied in Burdett and Judd (1983) to the
case in which consumers have heterogeneous search costs. We also work with the nite-number-of-
rms case, so we can study how price reponsiveness to entry depends on the shape of the search
cost distribution. While such an extension has seen applications in empirical work (cf. Hong and
Shum, 2006; and Moraga Gonz alez and Wildenbeest, 2008), the existence and characterization of
price dispersed equilibria has not yet been shown. We rst demonstrate that rm and consumer
optimal behavior can be integrated in such a way that the market equilibrium can be described
by an N-dimensional nonlinear system of equations. This is useful because of two reasons. First,
it provides us with a simple way to simulate the market equilibrium and, second, it enables us to
address the existence of equilibrium issue using a xed point argument. Our main theorem shows
that an equilibrium always exists for arbitrary search cost distributions with strictly increasing cdf.
In addition, we provide a partial result on uniqueness of equilibrium.
The paper also studies how the number of rms aects equilibrium pricing. We nd that the shape
of the search cost distribution is relevant. In fact, when consumers have similar search costs, mean
prices fall and consumer surplus increases in the number rms. By contrast, if search costs are
relatively dispersed across the consumer population, mean prices increase and consumer surplus may
fall as the number of rms increases.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we present the nonsequential consumer
search model studied here. In Section 3 we discuss existence and uniqueness of a price dispersed
symmetric equilibrium. In Section 4 we present simulation results illustrating the eects of an
increase in the number of rms. All the proofs are placed in the Appendix to ease the reading.
2 The model
We examine an oligopolistic version of Burdett and Judd (1983) with consumer search cost hetero-
geneity. The details of the model follow. N rms produce a good at unit costs that we normalize
to zero.1 There is a unit mass of buyers. Each consumer inelastically demands one unit of the good
and is willing to pay for the good a maximum of v. Consumers search for prices nonsequentially and
buy from the cheapest store in their sample. Obtaining price quotations, including the rst, is costly.
Search costs dier across consumers. A buyer's search cost is drawn independently from a common
1The number of rms can be set equal to innity in which case N should be interpreted as the maximum number
of rms a consumer can obtain price quotations from.
2atomless distribution G(c) with support (0;1) and positive density g(c) everywhere. A consumer
with search cost c sampling k rms incurs a total search cost kc.
Firms and buyers play a simultaneous moves game. An individual rm chooses its price taking rivals'
prices as well as consumers' search behavior as given. A rm i's strategy is denoted by a distribution
of prices Fi(p). Let F i(p) denote the vector of prices charged by rms other than i. The (expected)
prot to rm i from charging price pi given rivals' strategies is denoted (pi;F i(p)). Likewise,
an individual buyer takes as given rm pricing and decides on his/her optimal search strategy to
maximize his/her expected utility. The strategy of a consumer with search cost c is then a number
k of prices to sample. Let the fraction of consumers sampling k rms be denoted by k. We shall
concentrate on symmetric Nash equilibria. A symmetric equilibrium is a distribution of prices F(p)
and a collection f0;1;:::;Ng such that (a) i(p;F i(p)) is equal to a constant  for all p in the
support of F(p), 8i; (b) i(p;F i(p))   for all p, 8i; (c) a consumer sampling k rms obtains no
lower utility than by sampling any other number of rms; and (d)
PN
k=0 k = 1. Let us denote the
equilibrium density of prices by f(p), with maximum price p and minimum price p.
3 Analysis
We rst indicate that, for an equilibrium to exist, there must be some consumers who search just
once and others who search more than once.
Proposition 1 If a symmetric equilibrium exists, then 1 > 1 > 0 and k > 0 for some k =
2;3;:::;N.
The intuition behind this result is simple. Suppose all consumers did search at least twice; then all
rms would be subject to price comparisons with rival rms so rm pricing would be competitive.
This however is contradictory because then consumers would not be willing to search that much in
the rst place. Suppose now that no consumer did compare prices; then rms would charge the
monopoly price. This is also contradictory because in that case consumers would not be willing to
search at all.2
We next observe that, given consumer behavior, for an equilibrium to exist it must be the case that
rm pricing is characterized by mixed strategies.
Proposition 2 If a symmetric equilibrium exists, F(p) must be atomless with upper bound equal to
v.
That dispersion must arise is easily understood. If a particular price is chosen with strictly positive
probability then a deviant can gain by undercutting such a price. This competition for the price-
comparing consumers cannot drive the price down zero since then a deviant would prefer to raise its
price and sell to the consumers who do not compare prices.
We now turn to consumers' search behavior. Expenditure minimization requires a consumer with
cost c to continue to draw prices from the price distribution F(p) till the expected gains of searching
one more time fall below her search cost. The expected gains from searching k+1 prices rather than k
prices are given by E[minfp1;p2;:::;pk+1g] E[minfp1;p2;:::;pkg]; where E denotes the expectation
operator. These gains are strictly positive, decreasing and convergent to zero (see MacMinn, 1980).
2In the original model of Burdett and Judd (1983) the rst price quotation is obtained at no cost and this implies
that there always exists an equilibrium where all rms charge the monopoly price.
3As a result, a consumer with search cost c will choose to sample k rms provided that the following
three inequalities hold:
v   E[minfp1;p2;:::;pkg]   kc > 0;
E[minfp1;p2;:::;pk 1g]   E[minfp1;p2;:::;pkg] > c;
E[minfp1;p2;:::;pk+1g]   E[minfp1;p2;:::;pkg] < c;
Since the search cost distribution G(c) has support (0;1) and positive density everywhere, there
exists a consumer indierent between not searching at all and searching once. Let the search cost of
this consumer be denoted c0. Then
c0 = v   E[p]; (1)
since the expected surplus for a consumer who searches one time is v   E[p]. Consumers for whom
c  c0 obtain negative surplus if they search. As a result, the share of consumers who do not
participate in the market altogether is 0 =
R 1
c0 dG(c) > 0. Likewise, let ck be the search cost of the
consumer indierent between searching k times and searching k + 1 times:
ck = E[minfp1;p2;:::;pkg]   E[minfp1;p2;:::;pk+1g]; k = 1;2;:::;N   1: (2)
Consumers for whom ck 1  c  ck search k times. As a result k =
R ck 1
ck dG(c) > 0; k = 2;3;:::;N.
The following result summarizes:
Proposition 3 Given any atomless price distribution F(p), optimal consumer search behavior is
characterized as follows: consumers whose search cost c  cN 1 search for N prices, consumers
whose search cost c 2 [ck 1;ck] search for k prices, k = 1;2;:::;N  1, and consumers whose search
cost c  c0 stay out of the market, where ck, k = 0;1;2;:::;N  1, is given by equations (1) and (2).
Proposition 3 shows that for any given atomless price distribution optimal consumer search leads to
a unique grouping of consumers.
We now examine rm pricing behavior. Given consumer search strategies, a rm i charging pi sells
to a consumer who compares k prices whenever the price of the other k   1 rms is higher than pi;
which happens with probability (1 F(pi))k 1: Therefore the expected prot to rm i from charging










In equilibrium, a rm must be indierent between charging any price in the support of F(p) and
charging the upper bound p. Thus, any price in the support of F(p) must satisfy i(pi;F(p)) =








= 1(v   r): (3)
Unfortunately, this equation cannot be solved for F(pi) analytically (except in special cases). How-








4Note that the RHS of equation (4) is positive and does not depend on F(pi). By contrast, since
F(pi) must take values on [0;1]; the LHS of equation (4) is a positive-valued function that decreases
in F(pi) monotonically. At F(pi) = 0; the LHS takes on value
PN
k=1 kk, while at pi = v it takes on
value 1. As a result, for every price pi 2 (p;v); there is a unique solution to equation (4) satisfying
F(pi) 2 [0;1]; moreover, the solution F(pi) is monotonically increasing in pi: The following result
summarizes these ndings.
Proposition 4 Given consumer search behavior fkgN
k=0, there exists a unique symmetric equi-






according to the price distribution dened implicitly by equation (3).
Proposition 4 shows that the equilibrium price distribution is unique for any given grouping of con-
sumers. For the price distribution in Proposition 4 to be an equilibrium of the game, the conjectured
grouping of consumers has to be the outcome of optimal consumer search. This requires that the









with 0 = 1  
PN
k=1 k and where c0 and ck;k = 1;2;:::;N   1 are the solutions to
c0 = v   E[p]; (7)
ck = E[minfp1;p2;:::;pkg]   E[minfp1;p2;:::;pk+1g]; k = 1;2;:::;N   1; (8)
where the expectation operator is taken over the distribution of prices which solves equation (3).
Using the distributions of the order statistics, and after successively integrating by parts, we can








F(p)(1   F(p))kdp; k = 1;2;:::;N   1: (10)




k=1 kk(1   z)k 1 + r: (11)
Using this inverse function, integration by parts and the change of variables z = F(p) in equations
(9) and (10) yields:







p(z)[(k + 1)z   1](1   z)k 1dz; k = 1;2;:::;N   1: (13)
Therefore we can state that:
5Proposition 5 If a symmetric equilibrium of the game exists then consumers search according to
Proposition 3, rms set prices according to Proposition 4, and the series of critical cuto points
fckgN 1
k=0 is given by the solution to the system of equations:







k=1 k[G(ck 1)   G(ck)]uk 1du
!
; (14)





kuk 1   (k + 1)uk
PN
k=1 k[G(ck 1)   G(ck)]uk 1 du; k = 1;2;:::;N   1: (15)
This result is useful for two reasons. First, it provides a straightforward way to compute and simulate
the market equilibrium. For xed v, r and G(c), the system of equations (14){(15) can be solved
numerically. If a solution exists, then the consumer equilibrium is given by equations (5){(6) and
the price distribution follows readily from equation (11). Secondly, this result enables us to address
the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium issues, which are the subject of our next statement.
Theorem 1 For any consumer valuation v and rm marginal cost r such that v > r  0 and for
any search cost distribution function G(c) with support (0;1) such that either g(0) > 0 or g(0) = 0
and g0(0) > 0, an equilibrium exists in a market with an arbitrary number of rms N. Moreover,
when N = 2 and g0() ' 0, there exists a unique equilibrium.
The proof of this result, which is in the Appendix, builds on Brouwer's xed point theorem. To
apply the theorem, we rst construct an auxiliary mapping and show that a market equilibrium is
given by a xed point of such mapping. A diculty we encounter in applying Brouwer's xed point
theorem directly is that the auxiliary mapping happens to be discontinuous at zero. This would not
be a problem if we could bound the domain of denition of the auxiliary mapping. However, it is
not possible to nd a bound of the domain of denition that is appropriate for arbitrary search cost
distributions. Because of this, we modify the auxiliary mapping in the neighborhood of 0 and apply
Brouwer's xed point theorem to the modied auxiliary mapping.
Theorem 1 also establishes uniqueness of equilibrium when the market is operated by two rms
and the search cost distribution is uniform. General results on uniqueness prove to be very dicult
because we cannot compute the equilibrium explicitly. However, simulations of the model for dierent
parameters and search cost distributions suggest the uniqueness result is more general.
4 Price equilibrium and the number of rms
In this section we illustrate the importance of the shape of the search cost distribution for pricing.
In particular we focus on how entry aects pricing for dierent search cost distributions.3 The price
and welfare eects of entry in our model are dicult to derive analytically since the equilibrium price
distribution cannot be obtained in closed-form. We then proceed by solving the model numerically.
Consider a market where consumer valuations are identical and let v = 100; in addition, assume
that the rst price quotation is obtained at no cost. These two assumptions together imply that all
3Janssen and Moraga-Gonz alez (2004) study the eects of entry in a model with a two-point search cost distribution
that includes an atom of shoppers.
6consumers buy in equilibrium. This is convenient since it allows us to isolate the single mechanism
through which entry in
uences the aggregate outcome: the amount of search. The rms' marginal
cost r is set equal to 50.
Let us assume that search costs follow a log-normal distribution, with parameters (c;c). In what
follows, we x the mean search cost to 50 and compare how the market works for two dierent levels
of search cost dispersion. In particular, we focus on the eects of entry on prices and surplus and
study how these eects depend on the amount of search cost dispersion. We start with a market
where search cost dispersion is relatively low. For this we set (c;c) = (2:63;1:6).4 Given the other
data, we solve for the equilibrium of the model for dierent number of rms. The results are reported
in Table 1.
N = 2 N = 3 N = 4 N = 5 N = 6 N = 7 N = 8 N = 9 N = 10 N = 11 N = 12 N = 13
1 1.00 0.86 0.81 0.79 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77
2 0.00 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
3 - 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
4 - - 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
5 - - - 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
6 - - - - 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
7 - - - - - 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
8 - - - - - - 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
9 - - - - - - - 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
10 - - - - - - - - 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
11 - - - - - - - - - 0.01 0.00 0.00
12 - - - - - - - - - - 0.01 0.00
13 - - - - - - - - - - - 0.01
Table 1: Equilibrium search intensities for (c;c) = (2:63;1:6) (mean is 50; CV is 3.45)
Table 1 shows how consumer search intensities change as we increase the number of rms. Remark-
ably, in this market a large majority of the consumers searches only once. For example, when there
are just two rms in the market the fraction of consumers who do not compare prices is almost 100%.
This number remains high but decreases as we increase the number of rms. A second important
feature is that very few consumers make an exhaustive search in the market; in fact for example if
there are 10 rms in the industry about 94% of the consumers searches for a maximum of 4 rms.
<insert gure 1 about here>
The fact that most consumers do not compare prices is re
ected in equilibrium prices. Figure 1(a)
shows how mean prices change with the number of rms. The average price under duopoly is very
high and it decreases as the number of rms rises. The decrease of the mean price is due to the fact
that the share of consumers comparing two or three prices increases in the number of rms. The
average price is what is important for consumers who do not exercise price comparisons so consumers
benet from the resulting average price decreases. These gains are also re
ected in that consumer
surplus, plotted in Figure 1(b), increases in N. Figures 1(c) and 1(d) show the behavior of aggregate
prots and social welfare. The welfare result is perhaps surprising and it deserves an explanation.
Note from Table 1 that the amount of search increases in N and that, since search costs are wasteful,
more search generates a welfare loss. In sum, entry in this case of low search cost dispersion would
lead to lower average prices, higher consumer surplus, lower industry prots and higher welfare.
4Mean search cost is equal to e
+2=2 ' 50 and standard deviation
p
(e2  1)e2+2 ' 172:74.
7The situation is quite dierent when search costs are much more dispersed, holding everything else
equal. Let us set (c;c) = (0:79;2:5), which implies the new search cost distribution is a mean-
preserving spread of the previous one. The new equilibrium search intensities are reported in Table
2. What is dierent in this case of high search cost dispersion is that a great deal of consumers
conduct an exhaustive search; as before, the extent of price comparison in the market increases as
the number of rms rises.
N = 2 N = 3 N = 4 N = 5 N = 6 N = 7 N = 8 N = 9 N = 10 N = 11 N = 12 N = 13
1 0.37 0.32 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29
2 0.63 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
3 - 0.54 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
4 - - 0.47 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
5 - - - 0.42 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
6 - - - - 0.37 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
7 - - - - - 0.33 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
8 - - - - - - 0.30 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03
9 - - - - - - - 0.27 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
10 - - - - - - - - 0.25 0.03 0.03 0.03
11 - - - - - - - - - 0.22 0.02 0.02
12 - - - - - - - - - - 0.21 0.02
13 - - - - - - - - - - - 0.19
Table 2: Equilibrium search intensities for (c;c) = (0:79;2:5) (mean is 50; CV is 22.73)
Figure 2 plots the equilibrium mean price against the number of competitors in the industry. Under
duopoly, the average price is relatively low compared to the previous case. What is remarkably
dierent is that the mean price increases as more rms enter the industry. Moreover, we see that
consumer surplus can decrease and prots increase as we the number of competitors goes up. The
crucial distinction between this case and the previous one is the equilibrium consumer search intensity.
Table 2 shows that most of the consumers (more than 63%) exercise price comparisons in this case
while Table 1 showed the opposite evidence. Consumers who conduct an exhaustive search in the
market become disproportionately less attractive for a rm as more competitors are around. This
eect, which leads to higher prices, has here a dominating in
uence and results in lower consumer
surplus and greater industry prots. Welfare is again decreasing in N due to the rise of actually
incurred search costs.
<insert gure 2 about here>
In summary, this section shows that entry can lead to an increase or to a decrease in average prices
and that the direction of the eect depends on the extent of search frictions in the market.
8Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. First, suppose, on the contrary, that 1 = 0. Then we have two possibili-
ties: (i) either 0 = 1 in which case the market does not open, or (ii) k > 0 for some k = 2;3;:::;N
in which case all rms would charge a price equal to the marginal cost r. But if this were so, con-
sumers would gain by deviating and searching less. Second, suppose, on the contrary, that 1 = 1.
Then rms prices would be equal to the monopoly price v. But if this were so then consumers would
gain by deviating and exiting the market. Finally, suppose, on the contrary, that 1 > 1 > 0 and
that k = 0 for all k = 2;3;:::;N. Then 0 + 1 = 1 and the argument applied before would hold
here too; as a result, there must be some k  2 for which k > 0. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose, on the contrary, that rms did charge a price ^ p 2 (r;v] with
strictly positive probability in equilibrium. Consider a rm i charging ^ p. The probability that ^ p is
the only price in the market is strictly positive. This occurs when all other rms are charging ^ p.
From Proposition 1 we know that in equilibrium there exists some ^ k  2 for which ^ k > 0. Consider
the fraction of consumers sampling ^ k rms. The probability that these consumers are sampling rm
i is strictly positive; as a result, rm i would gain by deviating and charging ^ p " since in that case
the rm would attract all consumers in ^ k who happened to sample rm i. This deviation would
give rm i a discrete increase in its prots and thus rules out all atoms in the set (r;v]. It remains
to be proven that an atom at the marginal cost r cannot be part of an equilibrium either. Consider
a rm charging r. From Proposition 1 we know that 1 > 1 > 0. As a result, this rm would serve
a fraction of consumers at least as large as 1=N but obtain zero prots. This implies that the rm
would have an incentive to deviate by increasing its price. We now prove that the upper bound of
F(p) must be equal to v. Suppose not and consider a rm charging an upper bound p < v. Since
this rm would not sell to any consumer who compares prices, its payo would simply be equal
to (p   r)1=N, which is strictly increasing in p; as a result the rm would gain by deviating and
charging v. 
Proof of Theorem 1. Let  := v   r and consider the change of variables xk := G(ck). Then we


















h=1 h(xh 1   xh)uh 1
h




;k = 1;2;:::;N   1; (xN = 0):
Since x0 = G(c0) > 0 in any interesting market equilibrium, we can dene yk =
xk
x0. Then the







1   y1 +
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h=2 h(yh 1   yh)uh 1du
!
;
x1 = x0y1;:::;xN 1 = x0yN 1;









kuk 1   (k + 1)uk
1   y1 +
PN








1   y1 +
PN
h=2 h(yh 1   yh)uh 1du
!; k = 1;2;:::;N   1; (yN = 0): (16)
9We are looking for a solution of this latter system in [0;1]
N 1 for which y1  y2  :::  yN 1. For
this purpose, we dene the set Y = f(y1;y2;:::;yN 1) 2 [0;1]
N 1 : y1  y2  :::  yN 1g. Likewise,









kuk 1   (k + 1)uk
1   y1 +
PN








1   y1 +
PN
h=2 h(yh 1   yh)uh 1du
!; k = 1;2;:::;N   1; (yN = 0):
Then the solution of the system (16) is a xed point of H. In what follows we apply Brouwer's
theorem to show that the function H has a xed point.
First we show that the function H takes values in the set Y . This is intuitively clear based on
the properties of the model since by appropriate transformations it is equivalent to the inequalities
c0  c1  :::  cN 1. Here we provide a direct proof.
Lemma 1 The function H() takes values in Y .
Proof. Take an arbitrary y 2 Y nf0g. We need to prove that 0  Hk (y)  1 for all k = 1;2;:::;N 1
and Hk (y)  Hk 1 (y) for all k = 2;:::;N   1. The inequality 0  Hk (y) follows straightforwardly
from the nonnegativity of G. In order to prove Hk (y)  1 and Hk (y)  Hk 1 (y) we use integration
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1   y1 +
PN
h=2 h(yh 1   yh)(1   u)
h 1
2 du:





1   y1 +
PN






h=2 h(h   1)(yh 1   yh)uh 2
i

1   y1 +
PN
h=2 h(yh 1   yh)uh 1
2 du:





kuk 1   (k + 1)uk
1   y1 +
PN





1   y1 +
PN







(1   y1)uk (1   u)
hPN
h=2 h(h   1)(yh 1   yh)uh 2
i

1   y1 +
PN
h=2 h(yh 1   yh)uh 1
2 du:
10The inequality Hk(y)  1 follows from the fact that u  uk(1   u) while the inequalities Hk(y) 
Hk 1(y), k = 2;3;:::;N 1 follow because all terms in the expressions of the integrals are nonnegative
and uk is decreasing in k. 
We now apply Brouwer's xed point theorem to prove a xed point of H exists. Since the denominator
of Hk is 0 for y = 0, we need to modify the function H in the neighborhood of 0. We do this in three
steps: (i) We rst prove that the limit inferior of H when y ! 0 is strictly positive (Proposition 6).
(ii) We then construct a neighborhood V of 0 such that H is continuously extendable from Y nV to
Y such that the extended function has no xed point in V (Lemma 3, Lemma 4). (iii) Finally, we
apply Brouwer's xed point theorem to the extended function to establish the existence of a solution
of the system (16).
We start by showing that the limit inferior of H is strictly positive. Since Hk(y)  Hk 1(y),








3 if g (0) > 0;
1
9 if g (0) = 0 and g0 (0) > 0:
Proof. By denition liminfy!0
y2Y
H1 (y) = lim
"!0
inf fH1 (y) : y 2 Y \ B (0;") n f0gg, where B (0;") =

x 2 RN 1 : kxk < "
	
. By Lemma 2 below there exists an " > 0 such that H1 (y) is increasing in yk
for k = 2;:::;N   1 on Y \ B (0;") n f0g. This implies that for any y 2 Y \ B (0;") n f0g such that
y1 > 0

































































y1 ! 0; y1 > 0. We show that this limit inferior is just equal to the limit, due to the fact that the




















































0 (1   2u)du
R 1

















































































0 ( 2u)(1   2u)du
R 1
0 u(1   2u)du + g (0)
R 1






0 udu + g (0)
R 1
0 2u(1   2u)du
=
R 1
0 ( 2u)(1   2u)du
R 1










Lemma 2 There exists an " > 0 such that H1 (y) is increasing in yk for k = 2;:::;N   1 on
Y \ B (0;") n f0g.





where U;D : Y ! R





(1   y1)(1   2u)
1   y1 +
PN









1   y1 +
PN
h=2 h(yh 1   yh)uh 1du
!
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PN
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PN







(1   y1)(1   2u)

kuk 1   (k + 1)uk

1   y1 +
PN







kuk 1   (k + 1)uk

1   y1 +
PN
h=2 h(yh 1   yh)uh 1
2du:
By integration by parts







h=2 h(h   1)(yh 1   yh)uh 2

1   y1 +
PN
h=2 h(yh 1   yh)uh 1
3du:
12Now, ID  0 for any y 2 Y because all terms in the integral are nonnegative. Therefore @D
@yk  0 for
any y 2 Y , which implies that D is decreasing in yk at any point y 2 Y .










(k + 1)(k + 2)
> 0:
So for each k there is an "k > 0 such that IU (y)  0 for any y 2 Y \ B (0;"k); so for " =
minf"2;:::;"N 1g it holds that IU (y)  0 for any y 2 Y \ B (0;"). Therefore @U
@yk  0 for any
y 2 Y \B (0;") and k = 2;:::;N  1. This implies that U is increasing in yk for any y 2 Y \B (0;").
This establishes that H1 (y) is increasing in yk for any y 2 Y \ B (0;") n f0g. 
So we have established that the limit inferior of H1 (y) when y ! 0 is strictly positive. Then the
following statement establishes that there is an " > 0 such that the set Y \ [0;"]
N 1 can take the
role of the neighborhood V mentioned above.
Lemma 3 Let H : Y n f0g ! RN 1 be a continuous function such that liminfy!0
y2Y
H1 (y)  a > 0.
Then there exists " > 0 such that H1 (y) > " for any y = (y1;y2;:::;yN 1) 2 Y n f0g with y1  ".
Proof. Condition liminfy!0
y2Y
H1 (y)  a > 0 implies that for any  > 0 there exists " > 0 such that
H1 (y) > a  for any y = (y1;y2;:::;yN 1) 2 Y nf0g with y1  ". Take 1 > 0 such that a 1 > 0.
Then there exists "1 > 0 such that H1 (y) > a   1 for any y = (y1;y2;:::;yN 1) 2 Y n f0g with
y1  "1. Now, if a   1 > "1 then choose " = "1 and the result is proved. If a   1  "1 then choose
" > 0 such that a   1 > ". For any y = (y1;y2;:::;yN 1) 2 Y n f0g with y1  " < "1 it holds that
H1 (y) > a   1 > ", so in this case the result is proved as well. 
Since we established condition liminfy!0
y2Y
H1 (y)  a > 0 in Proposition 6 we can now use " from





H (y) for y 2 Y n Y";
H (";y2;:::;yN 1) for y 2 Y";
where Y" = f(y1;y2;:::;yN 1) 2 Y : y1  "g = Y \ [0;"]
N 1. Notice that J is also dened in 0.
Lemma 4 The function J has the properties: (i) J is continuous. (ii) J takes values in Y . (iii) J
has no xed point in Y".
Proof. (i) Based on the fact that H is continuous, J is also continuous at points y that are not
on the boundary between Y" and Y n Y". The only non-trivial case is when y is on the boundary
between Y" and Y n Y", that is, in f(y1;y2;:::;yN 1) 2 Y : y1 = "g. In this case the limit of J (tn)
for a sequence (tn)n1  f(y1;y2;:::;yN 1) 2 Y : y1 > "g with tn ! y should be J (y). Indeed,
J (tn) = H (tn) ! H (y) = H (";y2;:::;yN 1) = J (y).
(ii) The fact that J takes values in Y follows from Lemma 1 trivially for the case (y1;y2;:::;yN 1) 2
Y n Y". For the case (y1;y2;:::;yN 1) 2 Y" it follows because (";y2;:::;yN 1) 2 Y for any
(y1;y2;:::;yN 1) 2 Y", so J (";y2;:::;yN 1) = H (";y2;:::;yN 1) 2 Y .
13(iii) For an arbitrary (y1;y2;:::;yN 1) 2 Y" we have J1 (y1;y2;:::;yN 1) = H1 (";y2;:::;yN 1).
Since y = (";y2;:::;yN 1) 2 Y nf0g with y1  ", by Lemma 3 it holds that H1 (";y2;:::;yN 1) > ".
Thus J1 (y1;y2;:::;yN 1) > "  y1, so (y1;y2;:::;yN 1) cannot be a xed point of J. 
Finally we can establish that the system of equations (16) has a solution. By Lemma 4 the function
J : Y ! Y is continuous. Y is a convex and compact set, so by Brouwer's xed point theorem
J has a xed point y. The xed point cannot be in Y" by Lemma 4, so y 2 Y n Y". Therefore
y = J (y) = H (y), that is, y 2 Y n Y" is a xed point of H. By denition, any xed point of H
is a solution of the system (16). This completes the proof of existence of equilibrium in Theorem 1.
















(x0   x1)(1   2u)




Using the notation introduced before, y1 = x1=x0 2 (0;1), the solution to this system of equations
is given by the solution to H1(y1)   y1 = 0, or






1   y1 + 2y1u
du =







1   y1 + 2y1u
du =




The derivations above in the proof of Proposition A.1 can readily be used to show that limy1!1
y1>0
(y1) =
G() > 0; limy1!0
y1>0
(y1) = 0 and limy1!0
y1>0
0 (y1) < 0: Therefore, if the function (y1) is strictly con-
vex, the equilibrium is unique. Let us now examine the second derivative of the function (y1). First
we have
0(y1) = G(   (1   y1)I(y1)) + y1g (   (1   y1)I(y1))
d( (1   y1)I(y1))
dy1




00(y1) = 2g (   (1   y1)I(y1))
d( (1   y1)I(y1))
dy1
+ y1g (   (1   y1)I(y1))
d2 ( (1   y1)I(y1))
dy2
1
















14When g0() = 0; this simplies to



















































































< 0 for all y1
Therefore we conclude that (y1) is strictly convex so the equilibrium is unique.
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16(a) Mean prices (b) Consumer surplus
(c) Producer surplus (d) Welfare
Figure 1: Comparative statics of an increase in the number of rms ((c;c) = (2:63;1:6))
17(a) Mean prices (b) Consumer surplus
(c) Producer surplus (d) Welfare
Figure 2: Comparative statics of an increase in the number of rms (c = 0:79;c = 2:5)
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